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Environmental Law
by W. Scott Laseter*
and

Julie V. Mayfield**
Departing somewhat from the format of earlier environmental law
survey articles,' this Survey devotes substantial attention to a 1998
decision of the United States Supreme Court in a case that arose under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 2 Although that case, United States v.
Bestfoods,3 emerged from the Sixth Circuit, it will almost certainly have
important ramifications for Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence in the area
of CERCLA operator liability. Further, the case may signal a new
conservative leaning by the Supreme Court that may extend beyond the
narrow issue of that case to other questions arising under CERCLA.
In addition to discussing Bestfoods, this Survey also discusses a recent4
case that arose under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")
and the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 5 as well as a recent case involving
* Partner in the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Environmental and Natural
Resources Section, Atlanta, Georgia. University of the South (B.A., 1984); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1990). Member, Mercer Law Review
(1988-1990).
** Law Clerk for the Honorable Robert J. Castellani, DeKalb County Superior Court.
Formerly an associate in the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Environmental and Natural
Resources Section, Atlanta, Georgia. Davidson College (B.A., cum laude, 1989); Emory
University School of Law (J.D., with distinction, 1996). Executive Articles Editor, Emory
International Law Review (1995-1996).
1. See W. Scott Laseter & Julie V. Mayfield, Environmental Law, 49 MERCER L. REV.
1007 (1998); W. Scott Laseter & Julie V. Mayfield, Environmental Law, 48 MERCER L. REV.
1577 (1997); W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1359 (1995);
Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1187
(1993); Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCER L. REV.
1411 (1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
3. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
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the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").' As with its more recent predecessors, this Survey will not provide a sketch of the broad statutory and
regulatory schemes of these statutes; rather, it will refer to earlier
survey editions for general overview as well as additional cases that
address these laws.
I.

COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABILITY ACT

In Bestfoods the Court considered for the first time the scope of
operator liability for parent corporations under CERCLA.7 In doing so,
the Court potentially called into question the validity of hundreds of
cases decided by federal circuit and district courts during the last fifteen
years.
Prior to Bestfoods, federal courts had shown considerable disagreement
concerning when a parent corporation should be held liable as an owner
or operator of a facility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances. 8
Under what was probably the most expansive view, the Fourth Circuit
employed an "authority to control" test by which a parent corporation
could be held liable if it had the mere authority to control the subsidiary's operations.9 At the other end of the spectrum, the Sixth Circuit
held that, for the most part, a parent could be found liable only if its
domination of the subsidiary was sufficient to pierce the corporate veil
under traditional corporate law principles. ° In between, the Eleventh
Circuit and several other circuits held that a plaintiff must show that
the parent exerted "actual control" over the subsidiary and that such
control could be inferred from evidence of involvement in managing the
subsidiary even though the evidence might not be sufficient to pierce the
corporate veil under traditional corporate law rules."
In Bestfoods, CPC International, Inc. ("CPC") owned substantially all
the shares of Ott Chemical Corporation ("Ott") from 1965 to 1972, during
which time large quantities of hazardous substances were released into
the environment at the Ott facility.' 2 During this time, CPC controlled
the selection of Ott's officers and board members. 13 Additionally, the

6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
7. 118 S.Ct. at 1881.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994).
9. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992).
10. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1997).
11. See, e.g., Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (11th
Cir. 1993).
12. 118 S. Ct. at 1882.
13. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 558, 559 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
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chairperson of the board of Ott was always a high level CPC executive.14 Furthermore, at least some individuals working for CPC were
involved at the Ott facility even though they did not have official
responsibilities for Ott. 5
Employing an "actual control" test, the district court found CPC liable
because CPC selected Ott's board of directors and populated Ott's
executive ranks with CPC officials and because one CPC official played
a significant role in shaping Ott's environmental compliance policy.' 6
However, based on its precedents employing a very narrow view of
operator liability, the Sixth Circuit reversed. 7 Although the circuit
court noted that it was at least theoretically possible to find a parent
corporation directly liable as an operator, writing that "[alt least
conceivably, a parent might independently operate the facility in the
stead of its subsidiary; or, as a sort of joint venturer, actually operate
the facility alongside its subsidiary," it rejected the district court's use
of the broader "actual control" approach. 18 The circuit court held that
where a parent corporation is sought to' be held liable as an operator
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) based upon the extent of its control
of its subsidiary which owns the facility, the parent will be liable only
when the requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil [under
state law] are met. In other words ... whether the parent will be

liable as an operator depends upon whether the degree to which it
controls its subsidiary and the extent and manner of its involvement.
with the facility, amount to the abuse of the corporate form that will

warrant piercing the corporate veil and disregarding the separate
corporate entities of the parent and subsidiary. 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.2" As a preliminary step in its
analysis, the Court framed the general standard for operator liability.
The Court stated that "an operator must manage, direct, or conduct
operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations having to
do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous21waste, or decisions about
compliance with environmental regulations."

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 561.
Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d at 577-80.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580.
Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884.
Id. at 1887.
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After summarily dispatching the "authority to control" test, the Court
criticized the "actual control" test for direct liability for a parent
corporation, stating:
The well-taken objection to the actual control test, however, is its
fusion of direct and indirect liability; the test is administered by asking
a question about the relationship between the two corporations (an
issue going to indirect liability) instead of a question about the parent's
interaction with the subsidiary's facility (the source of any direct
liability). If, however, direct liability for the parent's operation of the
facility is to be kept distinct from derivative liability for the subsidiary's own operation, the focus of the inquiry must necessarily be
different under the two tests. "The question is not whether the parent
operates the subsidiary,but rather whether it operates the facility, and
that operation is evidenced by participation in the activities of the
facility, not the subsidiary. Control of the subsidiary, if extensive
enough, gives rise to indirect liability under piercing doctrine, not
direct liability under the statutory language." The District Court was
therefore mistaken to rest its analysis on CPC's relationship with [Ott],
premising liability on little more than "CPC's 100-percent ownership
of [Ott]" and "CPC's active participation in, and at times majority
control over, [Ott]'s board of directors." The analysis should instead
have rested
on the relationship between CPC and the Muskegon facility
22
itself.

Thus, the Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that indirect
liability can only be predicated on factors that would justify piercing the
corporate veil.2" The Court based its decision on two well-founded
principles of corporate law: (1) "that a parent corporation (so-called
because of control through ownership of another corporation's stock) is
not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries"; 24 and (2) "that the corporate
veil may be pierced and the shareholder held liable for the corporation's
conduct when, inter alia, the corporate form would otherwise be misused
to accomplish certain wrongful purposes." 2' Finding that "[niothing in
CERCLA purports to rewrite [these rules]," the Court held that "when
(but only when) the corporate veil may be pierced, may a parent
corporation be charged
with derivative CERCLA liability for its
"
subsidiary's actions.

26

The Court further noted that "'it is entirely appropriate for directors
of a parent corporation to serve as directors of its subsidiary, and that

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1887-88 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
1885-86.
1884.
1885.
1885-86.
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fact alone may not serve to expose the parent corporation to liability for
its subsidiary's acts.'"27 The Court then created a presumption in favor
of finding that a person occupying positions for both the parent and
subsidiary corporations acts in fact on behalf of the corporation on whose
behalf he appears to act.28 The Court declared:
This recognition that the corporate personalities remain distinct has its
corollary in the "well established principle [of corporate law] that
directors and officers holding positions with a parent and its subsidiary
can and do 'change hats' to represent the two corporations separately,
despite their common ownership." Since courts generally presume "that
the directors are wearing their 'subsidiary hats' and not their 'parent
hats' when acting for the subsidiary," it cannot be enough to establish
liability here that dual officers and directors made policy decisions and
supervised activities at the facility. The [Plaintiff] would have to show
that, despite the general presumption to the contrary, the officers and
directors were acting in their capacities as CPC officers and directors,
and not as [Ott] officers and directors, when they committed those acts.
The District Court made no such inquiry here, however, disregarding
entirely this time-honored common law rule.29
Finally, the Court addressed the situation of the individual who works
for the parent but has some supervisory involvement with the subsidiary.3" The Court stated that courts must distinguish
a parental officer's oversight of a subsidiary from such an officer's
control over the operation of the subsidiary's facility. "[Aictivities that
involve the facility but which are consistent with the parent's investor
status, such as monitoring of the subsidiary's performance, supervision
of the subsidiary's finance and capital budget decisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures, should not give rise to direct
liability." The critical question is whether, in degree and detail, actions
directed to the facility by an agent of the parent alone are eccentric
under accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility.31
However, despite agreeing with the Sixth Circuit's view of indirect
liability, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's judgment and
remanded the case because it rejected as too narrow the Sixth Circuit's
opinion of the circumstances under which a parent could be directly

27.
1988)).
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 1888 (quoting American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 57 (2d Cir.
Id.
Id. at 1888-89 (citations omitted) (first alteration in original).
Id. at 1889.
Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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liable for its own conduct."2 Based on the involvement of one or more
CPC officials without roles in Ott's management in establishing
environmental policies at the facility in operation, the Supreme Court
decided further facts were required to decide the issue of direct
liability.33
The extent to which Bestfoods will impact the Eleventh Circuit's
approach to operator liability is unclear. Arguably, the Eleventh
Circuit's "actual control" test is consistent with Bestfoods. As the court
most recently described the standard in Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Saraland Apartments, 4 in order to establish "operator" liability, a
plaintiff must show the operator "either (1) actually participated in
operating the Site or in the activities resulting in the disposal of
hazardous substances, or (2) 'actually exercised control over, or [were]
otherwise intimately involved in the operations of' the Partnership." 5
Consistent with Bestfoods, the actual control test as articulated by the
Eleventh Circuit focuses on the facility in question. 3 Prior to Bestfoods, however, the Eleventh Circuit allowed the use of evidence of a
parent's domination of a subsidiary's corporate governance to create an
inference that the parent did, in fact, have sufficient control over the
facility's activities to result in liability.3 After Bestfoods, it seems clear
that a plaintiff seeking to hold a parent corporation liable must have
evidence of the parent's direct involvement in the facility, at least absent
facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil.
The broader implications of Bestfoods may take time to unfold. The
Court's decision implies a wider disagreement with lower courts'
apparent willingness to expand the bounds of traditional corporate law
"to avoid frustrating [CERCLA's] legislative purpose." 8 It is possible
that the decision may signify a trend towards narrowing the reach of
CERCLA liability more generally. The existence or nonexistence of that
trend will no doubt be the topic of much litigation in the years to come
and will likely occupy the pages of future editions of this survey.

32.
33.
34.
35.
1110).
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1885-87.
Id. at 1889-90.
94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1505 (alteration in original) (quoting Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 996 F.2d at
See Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 996 F.2d at 1110.
Id.
CPC Int'l, Inc., 777 F. Supp. at 571.
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NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hill v. Boy3 9 fits in a discussion of
either the CWA or NEPA. However, because the case resulted in a
comparatively rare victory by plaintiffs alleging arbitrary and capricious
conduct by a federal agency under NEPA, it is perhaps most enlightening to study as an example of a successful challenge under that statute.
In Hill, prior to issuing a permit pursuant to section 404 of the CWA
to the Carroll County Water Authority ("County") for construction of a
dam and reservoir in Carroll County, Georgia, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") conducted an environmental assessment
("EA") of the proposed project as required by NEPA.4' Under NEPA's
scheme, the EA stage represents a fork in the road. Down one path, if
the agency concludes, based on the EA, that the project will not significantly affect the environment, the agency issues a finding of no
significant impact ("FONSI"). 4' Down the other path, if the agency
concludes that the project would have a significant impact, the agency
must propose a detailed environmental impact statement ("EIS"). 42 The
burden of preparing an EIS is such that projects confronted by an EIS
requirement can be delayed for years (or eliminated altogether) even
though the ultimate outcome of an EIS never legally dictates a course of
action.'
Following its EA, the Corps issued a FONSI. Property owners
downstream from the proposed dam brought suit, claiming, in part, that
the Corps failed to comply with NEPA's requirements. At the heart of
plaintiffs' complaint was how to characterize a pipeline that ran beneath
the proposed lake site. Initially, the Corps described it as a natural gas
pipeline. When plaintiffs pointed out that it was actually a liquid
petroleum pipeline, the Corps claimed the discrepancy did not matter
because the pipeline was going to be moved. However, although the
County had apparently indicated to the Corps that the pipeline would
be moved, the Corps did not condition the section 404 permit on the
relocation of the pipeline. Plaintiffs argued that there was no evidence
in the administrative record that the County planned to relocate the
pipe."

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

144 F.3d 1446 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1447-48.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1998).
40 C.F.R. § 1502 (1998).
For more background on NEPA's statutory scheme, see Edward A. Kazmarek & W.
Scott Laseter, EnvironmentalLaw, 42 MERCER L. REV. 1411, 1412-13 (1991).
44. Hill, 144 F.3d at 1447-49, 1450.
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Reviewing the administrative record, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with
plaintiffs that "the current record does not support the Corps' assumption that the petroleum pipeline will be relocated."45 Given this
finding, the court then employed the following criteria in analyzing
whether the Corps' determination not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary
and capricious: (1) whether the Corps had accurately identified the
relevant environmental concern, (2) whether the Corps took a "hard
look" at the problem in preparing the EA, and (3) if the Corps found that
there would be no significant impact, whether it could make a convincing
case for that finding.46 The circuit court concluded that
the Corps failed to satisfy these three criteria in assessing the potential
adverse environmental impacts resulting from leaving the petroleum
pipeline underneath the proposed reservoir. In finding that the
[reservoir] project "will not have significant adverse impacts on the
quality of the human environment," the Corps explicitly assumed that
the pipeline would be removed. Thus, it is clear that the Corps did not
identify the environmental concerns related to the pipeline remaining
underneath the proposed reservoir, did not take a "hard look" at the
potential adverse environmental consequences of such a pipeline, and

did not make a convincing case for its finding of no significant impact
from such a pipeline. Therefore, we conclude that the Corps violated
NEPA by failing to adequately consider all relevant environmental
47
factors prior to making its finding of no significant impact.

As a result, because the circuit court held that the Corps' decision not to
prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious, it reversed the district
court's decision and remanded. 48
The plaintiff's victory in Hill may be limited by the narrow scope of
the issue remanded. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit directed the lower
court to "consider whether the petroleum pipeline will remain underneath the proposed Snake Creek reservoir and, if it will remain, whether
the presence of such a pipeline necessitates the preparation of an EIS for
the Snake Creek project." 9 The court noted, "if the Corps determines
on remand that the pipeline will be relocated, none of the other
arguments asserted on appeal by the property owners persuade us that
the Corps' issuance of the EA was arbitrary or capricious."" However,

45. Id. at 1451.

46. Id. at 1450 (citing Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 66-67
(D.C. Cir. 1987)). A fourth criterion is listed but is not relevant to this analysis. Id.

47. Id. at 1451.
48. Id. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the
first two counts of the complaint. Id. at 1452.
49. Id. at 1451.
50. Id. at 1451 n.14.
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even though the future legal battle may be limited in scope, the victory
certainly opened the door for plaintiffs to pursue political or other
nonlegal means of addressing their objections to the project.
Perhaps more importantly, the outcome may offer some strategic
insights into the prosecution and defense of NEPA claims. As suggested
in an earlier survey article, plaintiffs rarely, if ever, succeed in
challenging a federal agency's judgment in balancing impacts on the
environment against the perceived value of a proposed project.5
Rather, as in Hill, successful plaintiffs almost always prevail by showing
that the agency failed to consider a material fact or made some
fundamental analytical error.52 Thus, no matter how meritorious their
claims may be, plaintiffs should focus on the details of the agency's
procedures, not on its policies.

III.

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

In Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 3 the
Eleventh Circuit faced an issue of first impression in a case brought by
the loggerhead sea turtle, the green sea turtle, and two individuals
(collectively, "Turtles"). The loggerhead sea turtle and the green sea
turtle are, respectively, a threatened and an endangered species under
the ESA. 4 The Turtles sought preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief against Volusia County ("County"), a coastal county in northeast
Florida, claiming that the County's refusal to ban artificial beachfront
lighting and driving on the beach during turtle nesting season violated
the "take" provisions of the ESA."5 These provisions prohibit anyone
from harassing or harming an endangered or threatened species.5"

51. See Edward A. Kazmarek & W. Scott Laseter, Environmental Law, 42 MERCER L.
REv. 1411, 1421, (1991).
52. Id.
53. 148 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998).
54. Id. at 1234.
55. Id. at 1235. For a discussion of the statutory framework of the ESA, see W. Scott
Laseter & Julie V. Mayfield, Environmental Law, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1577, 1602-03 (1997).
The basis of the Turtles' claim regarding the artificial lighting was that when newborn
turtles hatch, they instinctively move toward the brightest light they see. In the absence
of man-made development, the brightest light is the moon's reflection on the ocean; thus,
the turtles make their way back to sea. In developed areas, however, the brightest lights
are often from artificial light sources inland, which draw the small turtles away from the
ocean and, most often, to their death. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1235. While it is not
clearly spelled out in the opinion, the likely basis for the Turtle's claim regarding driving

on the beach was that cars would either hit or disorient turtles trying to lay their eggs.
56. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a) (1994).

1014

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

The district court initially granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting
driving on the beach during turtle nesting season, but it declined to
grant an ifijunction prohibiting artificial beachfront lighting.57 The
County then moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that the
Turtles lacked standing to assert claims for takes that occurred in
municipalities within the county that independently regulated beachfront lighting within their jurisdictions. The district court granted the
motion, ruling (1) that the Turtles had not shown a causal connection
between the County's regulation of beachfront lighting and the takes
that occurred in self-regulating municipalities, and (2) that the injury
could not be redressed by the court without joinder of those municipalities.5" Shortly thereafter, the County received an incidental take
permit from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), which
permitted the County to engage in certain authorized activities that
would result in the taking of turtles. Agreeing with the County's
argument that the incidental take permit mooted the Turtles' claims, the
district court dismissed the suit.59
The Turtles appealed the dismissal of the suit and the partial grant
of summary judgment."
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the
dismissal of the suit, which the Turtles appealed on the basis that the
incidental take permit authorized incidental takes attributable to beach
driving only and did not authorize incidental takes attributable to
beachfront lighting.6 '
Although the permit addressed beachfront
lighting, it did so only in the context of mitigating measures that the
County had to implement as a condition of the permit. The Turtles
claimed that the discussion of beachfront lighting in the mitigation
section of the permit was not sufficient to authorize takes attributable
to the lighting. The County countered that the FWS had clearly
considered beachfront lighting in issuing the permit and that, therefore,
the County could not be liable for any takes attributable to beachfront
lighting if it implemented the lighting conditions contained in the
permit.62
The issue of whether an entity is exempted from liability under an
incidental take permit for takes that result from activities performed as

57. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1235.
58. Id. at 1236.

59. Id.
60. Id. The Turtles also appealed the district court's refusal to allow joinder of the
leatherback sea turtle as a plaintiff. The circuit court reversed the district court's decision
on this point, determining that the district court abused its discretion in not permitting the
leatherback sea turtle to join the litigation. Id. at 1258.

61. Id. at 1236.
62. Id. at 1236-37.
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mitigation measures under the permit appears to be one of first
impression in the Eleventh Circuit and other circuits.' In addressing
the issue, the court examined the permit and found that all the activities
authorized by the permit, meaning those activities that could result in
legal, incidental takes of turtles, related only to beach driving and not
to beachfront lighting. 6' Additionally, the court found that beachfront
lighting was discussed only as a mitigation measure and that the
mitigation section "does not contain any language expressly authorizing
takes of sea turtles through artificial beachfront lighting." 5 Finding
that the "ESA's text and the [Fish and Wildlife] Service's regulations
provide every indication that incidental take permission must be express
and activity-specific," the court stated that
it is readily apparent that the incidental take permit exhaustively lists
all authorized activities within Condition F and all mitigation
measures within Condition G. Activities relative to driving on the
beach are mentioned in both conditions. Activities relative to artificial
beachfront lighting, however, are mentioned only in Condition G.
Given the permit's structure, the express authority to take sea turtles
through artificial beachfront lighting-if the Service had so intended-would be memorialized in Condition F. This absence is dispositive.
Accordingly, Volusia County lacks the Service's express permission to
take sea turtles incidentally through artificial beachfront lighting."
In addition to this clear separation in the permit, the court found a
distinct dividing line in the ESA's text and the FWS's regulations
between authorized activities and mitigation measures.6 7 The court
also cited correspondence to the County from the FWS in which the FWS
stated clearly that it did not view the County's application for a permit
as including a request for incidental takes attributable to beachfront
lighting, but only for incidental takes attributable to beach driving.68
Finding that "no published case law even purports to suggest that purely
mitigatory measures fall within the scope of the incidental take permit
exception," 9 the court held that the district court erred in dismissing
the Turtles' claims.7"

63. Id. at 1242.
64. Id. at 1240.

65. Id. at 1242.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1242-43. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(iii), with § 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii).
Compare also 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(i), with § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii).
68. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1244.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 1246.
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The court then addressed whether the district court erred in granting
the County's motion for partial summary judgment on the basis that the
Turtles had no standing to bring claims for takes that occurred in
municipalities within the county that independently regulated beachfront lighting. 71 The court first restated the three requirements for
standing: (1) that there must be an injury in fact, (2) that there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct,
and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision
by the court.72 To determine if a causal connection existed between
takes in the separate municipalities and the County's regulations, the
court first examined the County's charter and beachfront lighting
regulations to determine whether the county's activities in governing
beachfront lighting were sufficiently related to the harm alleged by the
Turtles.7 3
In doing so, the court found that the County's charter required it to set
minimum standards for the protection of the environment that applied
throughout the county, including separate municipalities. 74 Pursuant
to this requirement, the County enacted an ordinance entitled "Minimum
Environmental Standards for Sea Turtle Protection," which the Turtles
alleged provided inadequate protections.75 Citing precedent from the
First and Eighth Circuits, the court noted that a governmental entity
may be liable for takes resulting from its regulatory actions.76 Holding
for the Turtles, the Eleventh Circuit explained:
Just as the Strahan agency was "vested with broad authority to
regulate fishing" under state law, Volusia County is "vested with broad
authority to regulate" artificial beachfront lighting under its charter
and ordinances. Volusia County would have us hold that Daytona
Beach, Daytona Beach Shores, Ormond Beach and New Smyrna Beach
are "intervening independent actor[s]" in the regulation of artificial
beachfront lighting. It is true that, as we concluded earlier, Ormond
Beach and New Smyrna Beach independently enforce their countyapproved lighting ordinances. In all other respects, however, no
"intervening independent actor" exists concerning lighting standards
and enforcement in Volusia County. As Volusia County concedes, it
possesses sufficient regulatory and enforcement control over artificial
beachfront lighting in all unincorporated areas and the Town of Ponce

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1247.
at 1247-48.
at 1247.
at 1248-49.

76. Id. at 1251 (citing Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1997); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Administrator, EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989)).
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Inlet. But for Volusia County's regulatory determination that Daytona
Beach and Daytona Beach Shores fall outside the sea turtle nesting
areas, light users in those locations would be subject to at least the
Minimum Environmental Standards for Sea Turtle Protection as
contained within Ordinance 89-60, as amended. Just as it was
impossible in Strahan "for a licensed commercial fishing operation to
use its gillnets or lobster pots in a manner permitted by the [agency]
without risk of violating the ESA[,]" a genuine issue of fact exists in
this case that the lighting activities of landowners along Volusia
County's beaches-as authorized through local ordinance-violate the
ESA. Accordingly, at the very least, the Turtles, analogous to the
conservationist in Strahan, have standing to proceed against Volusia
County for lighting-related "harm" in Daytona Beach, Daytona Beach
Shores, Ormond Beach and New Smyrna Beach-even though the
actions or inactions of those "third
parties not before the court" may be
77
another "cause of the harm[.
On the issue of redressibility, the court noted that the test "asks
whether it is 'likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.'" 8
Again finding for the
Turtles, the court held, "Given the Turtles' record evidence, we easily
conclude that if the district court were to grant the requested relief,
fewer protected sea turtles would be 'harmed' through misorienta'
tion."79
Loggerhead Turtle joins a growing body of Eleventh Circuit
case law under the ESA. °

77. Id. at 1253 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1254.
80. For a discussion of recent cases that arose under the ESA, see W. Scott Laseter &
Julie V. Mayfield, Environmental Law, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1577, 1602-05 (1997).

